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ORIGINALISM’S CURIOUSLY
TRIUMPHANT DEATH: THE
INTERPENETRATION OF
ASPIRATIONALISM AND HISTORICISM IN
U.S. CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT
FIDELITY TO OUR IMPERFECT CONSTITUTION. By
James E. Fleming.1 New York: Oxford University Press.
2015. Pp. xv + 243. $75.00 (cloth).
Ken I. Kersch2
As someone preoccupied with the nature and processes of
U.S. constitutional development from an empirical, positivist as
opposed to a prescriptive, normative perspective—in is rather
than ought—my interest in contemporary constitutional theory of
the sort practiced at a high level by Jim Fleming is oblique. I care
more about history than theories of justice, about how the
Constitution has actually been read to structure public (and
private) authority in the United States over time than about
justifying either the “best” readings of the parameters of that
authority generally, or worrying in particular about what theory
of interpretation can justify a judge in exercising his or her
purportedly problematic “counter-majoritarian” powers of
judicial review to hold legislation null and void on the grounds
that it contravenes the nation’s fundamental law.3 When I nod my
head “yes” about constitutional theory, it is thus most
immediately over what Michael Dorf identifies as the “‘eclectic’
1. Professor of Law and The Honorable Frank R. Kenison Distinguished Scholar in
Law, Boston University School of Law.
2. Professor of Political Science, Boston College. I am grateful to all of the
participants in the symposium on Jim Fleming’s book at La Universidad Nacional
Autonoma de Mexico (UNAM) in Mexico City (February 2015), and particularly to Jim
and our wonderful host, Imer Flores.
3. See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME
COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS (1962) (coining the term “counter-majoritarian
difficulty”); THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton).
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accounts” of Philip Bobbitt and Richard Fallon, scholars who
find—usefully, but not surprisingly—that over the long course of
American history, judges have used an array of “modalities,” or
types of arguments, in publicly justifying their decisions in their
judicial opinions.4 If one moves beyond judicial opinions to
constitutional arguments made in the roiling public sphere
(parties, elections, social movements, interest groups, and diverse
forms of individual and collective legal consciousness, including
political and legal claim-making), of course, the modes of
argument multiply, and the matter overspills the ambit of
professional, institutional justification.5 There is a lot of is out
there.
At the same time, however, certainly in the United States—
and perhaps in many other places as well—there is a lot of
“ought” in the “is.” What has happened is, in significant part, a
function of claims made, in various fora, about what should
happen. There is thus, and always has been, a lot of empirically
observable and verifiable “aspirationalism” in U.S. historical and
constitutional development. At the same time, however, there are
also a lot of empirically, positivistically verifiable appeals to
heritage and history in American aspirationalism—and that
aspirationalism also has a history. In light of these dynamics—
both aspects of which Fleming helpfully recognizes in Fidelity to
Our Imperfect Constitution—Fleming wants to call the fight for
aspirationalism. But I think the book as a whole shows that we
can call it a draw: there is no reason, or even grounds, for drawing
a sharp distinction between one and the other. The extent we feel
inclined to do so is an artifact of the trajectory of the living
constitutionalist-originalist debates of mid-to-late twentieth
century America, debates that Fleming’s book demonstrates, to

4. See Michael C. Dorf, Integrating Normative and Descriptive Constitutional
Theory: The Case of Original Meaning, 85 GEO. L.J. 1765, 1768 (1997). See generally PHILIP
BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION (1982); Richard
Fallon, A Constructivist Coherence Theory of Constitutional Interpretation, 100 HARV. L.
REV. 1189 (1987).
5. See JACK M. BALKIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REDEMPTION: POLITICAL FAITH IN AN
UNJUST WORLD (2011); PATRICIA EWICK & SUSAN S. SILBEY, THE COMMON PLACE OF
LAW: STORIES FROM EVERYDAY LIFE (1998); LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE
THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (2004); GEORGE
I. LOVELL, THIS IS NOT CIVIL RIGHTS: DISCOVERING RIGHTS TALK IN 1939 AMERICA
(2012); Emily Zackin, Lost Rights and the Importance of Audience, 49 TULSA L. REV. 421
(2013).
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me at least, are, in their most familiar forms, likely not long for
this world.
The Living Constitutionalist v. Originalist binary has long
seemed to me something of a parlor game: it was always a false
opposition. But Fleming fails to note that Living
Constitutionalism,
Aspirationalism,
and
Constitutional
Perfectionism are also “isms.” The two positions—at least in their
contemporary form in recent constitutional theory, born in an age
of isms— were mutually constitutive. Fleming’s Fidelity to Our
Imperfect Constitution aspires to transcend this binary and
reconcile in constitutional theory appeals to history and aspiration
to the best interpretation. While in the end, he doesn’t fully
succeed, I do agree with the core of the argument in this book, if
not its ultimate conclusion. What pleasantly surprises me is the
degree to which Fleming, a leading Rawlsian and Dworkinian
constitutional theorist, has incorporated the claims of history and
the insights of scholars of American political and constitutional
development (and the legal scholars who commune with them)
into his otherwise largely “philosophical” work. He suggests that
the essentials of the key portions of that work that he adopts
here—about “is,” and the concrete, and “fit”—were in Dworkin
and Rawls (Political Liberalism) all along—a not wholly
convincing bit of (creative) mopping up. But this is a matter for
intellectual historians. The key point is that, as constitutional
theory, what he sets out here, now, seems mostly to work.
HISTORY IN ASPIRATIONALISM/PERFECTIONISM
While recognizing the uses of history in constitutional
argument and justification, Fleming plainly sees the book’s takehome point as involving the preeminence of aspiration. Let’s
focus first on aspirationalism or perfectionism’s concessions to
history. First is Fleming’s acknowledgement of what (following
the later Rawls) we may call “political perfectionism.” “[T]o be
persuasive in our constitutional culture,” Fleming says here, “one
generally needs to argue that one’s interpretations fit with the
past, show the past in its best light or fulfill the promises of our
abstract moral commitments and aspirations.” (p. 108). He makes
clear, however, that this is in no way a concession to originalism
(or, at least, to the traditional, “old-time,” hard-form originalism
of Robert Bork and Antonin Scalia). “It is a moral reading or
philosophic approach that aspires to fidelity to our imperfect
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Constitution” (p. 108).6 And Fleming criticizes “constitutional
theorists who are not narrow originalists [including his earlier
self?] . . . [for] hav[ing] not paid sufficient attention to how
arguments based on history, both adoption history and postadoption history, function in constitutional law” (p. 136). Here,
Fleming highly praises recent work by Jack Balkin that does
precisely this.7 He signs on to the criticism by Balkin and his fellow
broad originalists of liberals and progressives for ignoring history
and ceding it to conservatives (pp. 136-37). Fleming is thus now
favorably disposed towards historical argument in constitutional
debate (and adjudication) if taken to advance a moral reading and
not as an alternative to it, with history acting in service to the
judges engaging in their primary responsibility of exercising moral
judgment (pp. 91-92).
At the same time, Fleming distances the constitutionperfecting, aspirationalist theory with which he has long been
associated from its longstanding ties to theories of judicial
supremacy, and takes a friendly stance toward pluralistic,
“protestant,” and departmentalist models of constitutional
practice8 (p. 174). He also acknowledges in an unconcerned way
the history of the plural constitutional forms of justification or
multiple modalities that have always been used by judges in their
judicial opinions—that is, the observations highlighted in the
eclectic accounts of Bobbitt and Fallon. In doing this, Fleming
here distances himself from living constitutionalism as an “ism”
(p. 57).
Fleming’s model, however, retains a clear hierarchy of
values, with history in the subservient or instrumental role,
honored rather than (necessarily) followed, servant, not rival, to
justice. While he certainly affords a role to historical arguments in
American constitutionalism, he is express—and emphatic—about
their subsidiarity: they are at most minor premises to philosophy’s
major premises about justice and the nature of the good.
This is problematic. I agree with Fleming’s conclusion that
fidelity is indispensable to any plausible constitutional theory: I,
for one, count this commitment to a duty to fidelity as yet another
6. For more on “inclusive originalism,” see William Baude, Is Originalism Our
Law?, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 2349 (2015), which Fleming cites for this point. (p. 193 n.2).
7. See Jack M. Balkin, The New Originalism and the Uses of History, 82 FORDHAM
L. REV. 641 (2013).
8. See SANFORD LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH (1988).
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of originalism’s victories—though Fleming insists it was there in
Dworkin all along.9 It was, after all, originalists who most centrally
and insistently tied the duty of fidelity to the Constitution’s status
as law, arguing that it was inherent in the very concept of the rule
of law (though, to be sure, they were hardly the only to note or
mention it). Law as fidelity was originalism’s great thrust.10
But Fleming’s position on history as handmaiden underplays
its indispensability as living constitutionalism’s life force.
Fleming’s failure to afford this reality its due highlights his
vestigial monism, in a book that breaks new ground in his
theoretical project in reconciling itself with constitutional
pluralism. Monism is hierarchical. And Fleming’s fondness for
philosophical clarity, for setting out hypotheses, premises, major
and minor, and the like in the form of formal logic, necessarily
entails this monistic hierarchy of values, in which justice is the
major premise and history the minor one. This is, I submit, the
wrong way to look at it.
There is a history here that Fleming does not tell in Fidelity
to Our Imperfect Constitution, perhaps because that history is
about the relationship over time between academic (and
particularly legal academic) constitutional theory and
party/movement politics driven by an underlying politics of
conservativism v. progressivism/liberalism. While he takes some
steps in the direction of emphasizing a non-binary, interpenetrating complexity, Fleming’s hierarchy remains wedded to
an ostensibly history-spurning “living constitutionalism,” set in
opposition to an aspiration-spurning originalism. But this is a
relatively contemporary construction, pitting “ism” against “ism.”
I will discuss conservatism later. But let’s take progressivism/
liberalism first.

9. See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE (1986).
10. This was true as well for the earlier liberal originalism of Hugo Black, who was
disturbed, for example, by Earl Warren’s casual indifference to its rule of law claims in his
opinion for the Court in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 492–93 (1954) (“In
approaching this problem, we cannot turn the clock back to 1868 when the Amendment
was adopted, or even to 1896 when Plessy v. Ferguson was written. We must consider
public education in the light of its full development and its present place in American life
throughout the Nation. Only in this way can it be determined if segregation in public
schools deprives these plaintiffs of the equal protection of the laws.”). See generally JON
ELSTER, ULYSSES AND THE SIRENS: STUDIES IN RATIONALITY AND IRRATIONALITY
(1979); JON ELSTER, ULYSSES UNBOUND: STUDIES IN RATIONALITY, PRECOMMITMENT,
AND CONSTRAINTS (2000).
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If living constitutionalism is understood as a common
modality involving adjustment of constitutional understandings to
take into account altered conditions, it, in fact, has a history that
dates back to the beginning of the country, and doubtless
before—which is why it is easy enough to go back and cherry-pick
ancient quotations to hurl at originalist opponents in
contemporary constitutional controversies (for example, “It is a
constitution we are expounding . . . adapt[able] to the various
crises of human affairs.”).11 It is also why there is truth underlying
David Strauss’s model of living constitutionalism as common law
constitutionalism. But living constitutionalism as an “ism”—that
is, as the one right way to do things, as forged against some
intransigent, conservative roadblock/barrier school of thought
that insisted otherwise—was born in the late nineteenth/early
twentieth centuries, and issued from two different and distinctive
wellsprings. The first was indubitably morally aspirationalist: it
involved aspirationalist conceptions of justice and equality, as
read into (typically) the rights provisions of the Civil War
Amendments (particularly the Fourteenth) and the invocation in
constitutional argument of the natural rights claims of the
Declaration of Independence. This aspirationalism was reformist,
and reform/social movement aspirationalism, as pioneered by
women’s rights advocates and abolitionists before the Civil War,
maintained its momentum in an ongoing trajectory, following
these textual additions, after the War.12 While commonly
considered an approach of the reformist left, this same moral
aspirationalism was applied to the concept of liberty/freedom by
the Supreme Court’s Lincoln appointees like Justice Stephen
Field and subsequent Republican appointees like (Ulysses S.
Grant appointee) Joseph Bradley and other “Lochner era”
conservatives. While random natural law claims, of course, dated
back to the country’s beginning and before (natural law as a
modality in a generally pluralist framework) when it was joined

11.
12.

McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 407, 415 (1819).
See J. DAVID GREENSTONE, THE LINCOLN PERSUASION: REMAKING
AMERICAN LIBERALISM (1993); Michael Vorenberg, Bringing the Constitution Back In:
Amendments, Innovation, and Popular Democracy During the Civil War Era, in THE
DEMOCRATIC EXPERIMENT: NEW DIRECTIONS IN AMERICAN POLITICAL HISTORY 120
(Meg Jacobs, William J. Novak & Julian E. Zelizer eds., 2003); Hendrik Hartog, The
Constitution of Aspiration and “The Rights that Belong to Us All,” 74 J. AM. HIST. 1013
(1987); see also ALEXANDER TSESIS, FOR LIBERTY AND EQUALITY: THE LIFE AND TIMES
OF THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (2012).
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with the reform movement thrust of abolitionism, natural law as
natural rights became a way of life for many U.S.
constitutionalists, and a cause—it became an “ism”.13
The second wellspring of modern living constitutionalism
was quite different. This was progressive majoritarianism,
premised on a robustly democratic reading of the (best)
constitutional order—the very reading Fleming rightly recognizes
in the recent work of Sandy Levinson. This democratic/
majoritarian living constitutionalism had an anti-legal (or antifidelity) thrust, at least as applied to the powers of the courts to
police constitutional boundaries. This progressive living
constitutionalism came in different forms, of course, from the
minimally legalist (Thayer’s “clear mistake” rule, and Holmes’s
similar approach) to anti-constitutionalist/pure majoritarianism
of some of that era—nicely canvassed recently by Aziz Rana—
that Fleming rightly recognizes in the recent work of Mike
Seidman. From a populist constitutional perspective, of course,
majoritarianism can be morally aspirational, with the populace
making moral arguments in the public sphere for legislation. But
it is not so much a moral reading of the Constitution as a call for
the Constitution to get out of the way of the aspiring,
perfectionist, justice-seeking people.14
13. See, e.g., Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. 87, 133 (1810); Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386 (1798).
While an issue in an array of contexts, the problem natural law foundations posed for
chattel slavery was always beneath the surface in the early republic, and only rose higher
over time. See, e.g., United States v. La Jeune Eugenie, 26 F. Cas. 832, 836 (D. Mass. 1822);
Somerset v. Stewart, 98 Eng. Rep. 499, 500 (1772); see also ROBERT M. COVER, JUSTICE
ACCUSED: ANTISLAVERY AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1975); JUSTIN BUCKLEY DYER,
NATURAL LAW AND THE ANTISLAVERY CONSTITUTIONAL TRADITION (2012). In a
recent book, John Compton has provocatively traced the living constitutionalism
underlying the expansion of the modern New Deal state to evangelical reformist origins.
See JOHN W. COMPTON, THE EVANGELICAL ORIGINS OF THE LIVING CONSTITUTION
(2014). Oddly, his book largely omits a discussion of abolitionism and slavery, but usefully
focuses on late nineteenth century religious reformism as applied to drinking and
gambling. See id. at 3–6 (describing national morals regulation as breakthrough/critical
juncture to expansions of the powers of the central administrative/social regulatory state).
14. SANFORD LEVINSON, OUR UNDEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION: WHERE THE
CONSTITUTION GOES WRONG (AND HOW WE THE PEOPLE CAN CORRECT IT) (2006);
LOUIS MICHAEL SEIDMAN, ON CONSTITUTIONAL DISOBEDIENCE (2012); Aziz Rana,
Progressivism and the Disenchanted Constitution, in THE PROGRESSIVES’ CENTURY:
POLITICAL REFORM, CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT, AND THE MAKING OF THE
AMERICAN STATE (Stephen Skowronek, Stephen Engel, & Bruce Ackerman eds., 2016);
James Bradley Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional
Law, 7 HARV. L. REV. 129 (1893). There are, of course, moral arguments for democracy,
but I will demur on those here. It is worth noting that, while they welcome change and
evolution, these two forms of living constitutionalism, the legalist and the anti-legalist, can
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There is then the middle ground—close to Fleming (and
Balkin’s) middle ground today—which takes the text as the
starting point of constitutional interpretation, but holds that much
of the text is either deliberately (or simply factually) broad and
indeterminate and recommends that we should—indeed, must,
inevitably—interpret it in light of our current needs, objectives,
and aspirations.15 Like Jack Balkin today, Woodrow Wilson,
writing almost exactly one century before (borrowing, I believe,
from Dicey), set out the metaphor of the Constitution as a house
that needs to be “built out” over time. Wilson too wrote about the
“construction zone”:
Sometimes, when I think of the growth of our economic system,
it seems to me as if, leaving our law just about where it was
before any of the modern inventions or developments took
place, we had simply at haphazard extended the family
residence, added an office here and a workroom there, built up
higher on our foundations, and put out little lean-tos on the
side, until we have a structure that has no character
whatsoever. Now, the problem is to continue to live in the
house and yet change it. Well, we are architects in our time, and
our architects are also engineers. We don’t have to stop using
a railroad terminal because a new station is being built. We
don’t have to stop any of the processes of our lives because we
are rearranging the structures in which we conduct these
processes. What we have to undertake is to systematize the
foundations of the house, then to thread all the old parts of the
structure with the steel which will be laced together in modern
fashion, accommodated to all the modern knowledge of
structural strength and elasticity, and then slowly change the
partitions, relay the walls, let in the light through new
apertures, improve the ventilation; until finally, a generation or
two from now, the scaffolding will be taken away, and there
will be the family in a great building whose noble architecture
will be at last disclosed, where men can live as a single
community, co-operative as in a perfected, coordinated
beehive, not afraid of any storm of nature, not afraid of any
artificial storm, any imitation of thunder and lightning,
knowing that the foundations go down to the bedrock of
principle, and knowing that whenever they please they can

also be read in stark opposition to each other (see, for example, Lincoln and his
commitment to the equality of natural rights as a representative of the first, and Stephen
Douglas, and his commitment to popular sovereignty, as a representative of the second).
15. See Charles A. Beard, The Living Constitution, 185 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. &
SOC. SCI. 29, 34 (1936).
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change that plan again and accommodate it as they please to
the altering necessities of their lives.16

It is notable that all of these first generation of living
constitutionalists were famous adepts at embedding their theories
in history. They all told stories, stories about the founding, stories
about the Civil War, stories about the progress of man. Many—
perhaps most—of these stories had a strong patriotic theme (it is
worth noting that while Balkin teaches us about construction
zones in an academic journal, Wilson set out his theory in public
speeches, subsequently assembled into a presidential campaign
manifesto, The New Freedom, which he leveraged to win the
White House). Progressives, in particular, were highly
nationalistic and patriotic. Herbert Croly’s New Nationalism, to
take just one (triumphant) example, justified change by renarrating the founding and its relation to necessary changes in the
present, calling famously for the achievement of Jeffersonian ends
by Hamiltonian means.17 None insisted on justice as major
premise and history as minor premise: they were two sides of the
same coin. This is not unrelated to their ultimate success.
Accordingly, while Fleming has gone a long way in the right
direction, this, in my view, is the next step: his next book should
take it.
Although he can’t quite break with a monism that makes
history the handmaiden of philosophy, Fleming does evince an
understanding of this in this book in a way much more
pronounced than he ever has before. He acknowledges
originalism’s appeal not just as a matter of the philosophy of the
rule of law, and hermeneutics, but in the United States in
particular, as a concrete country, with a history and a tradition—
indeed, a heritage: what Fleming calls “our constitutional
practice” (p. 60). He says “it is . . . likely that there are contingent
reasons for originalism’s normative appeal . . . in the United
States”—as if this “contingency” itself were a flaw in what would
otherwise be the glassy smooth surface of principle, rather than
what countries and peoples actually are18 (pp. 65-66). Still,
Fleming rightly acknowledges that contemporary originalists, all
16. WOODROW WILSON, THE NEW FREEDOM: A CALL FOR THE EMANCIPATION OF
THE GENEROUS ENERGIES OF A PEOPLE 50–52 (1914).
17. HERBERT CROLY, THE PROMISE OF AMERICAN LIFE (1909).
18. In this, he is following the path of the later Rawls (of Political Liberalism (1993))
as against the earlier Rawls (A Theory of Justice (1971)), in his own constitutional sphere.
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theories of legal obligation and judicial role and duties aside, are
appealing to the constitutional nationalism and “constitutional
patriotism” of Americans, a point earlier noted by both Dorf and
Balkin, which Fleming acknowledges and adopts.19 While it is
worth qualifying this point by remembering that, to some extent,
this too is a construction—see Michael Kammen’s cultural history
of Constitution-worship as trajectory, and Madison’s efforts to set
the public off the scent (to a certain extent) of the sayings and
doings of the Founders—it is still very much there, and as much
more than just a theory informing approaches to interpretation by
professionals.20 It is a political vision. When this vision was
employed by conservatives to oppose the rulings and reasoning of
the liberal, living constitutionalist Warren Court devoted to “the
pursuit of justice,” in the (ostensible) defense of an
abandoned/betrayed (and, later, a “lost” or “exiled”
Constitution), the living constitutionalists were both (initially)
triumphant, and set for a major fall. Fleming himself (and
Dworkin, Frank Michelman, and the rest) were once very far out
on that plank. Fidelity to Our Imperfect Constitution is Fleming’s
laudable attempt to walk himself back.21
And so we get a new seriousness about history, in what
Fleming is careful to ascribe as its proper place. His philosophic
approach “would use history for what it teaches rather than for
what it purportedly decides for us. In a constructivist world, we
would understand that history is a jumble of open possibilities, not
authoritative, determinate answers” (p. 22). He gives high praise
to “constructivist” constitutional theory, describing it as the best
new work in the field, work that “acknowledges the place of
history—most notably, original meaning, post-adoption history,
and precedent—as sources of constitutional interpretation. It not
only recognizes the limitations of history but also appreciates the
uses of history (which are different from conventional originalist

19. Balkin reaffirms Dorf on “ancestral” and “heroic” originalism. See Balkin, supra
note 7, at 682 n.120.
20. MICHAEL KAMMEN, A MACHINE THAT WOULD GO OF ITSELF: THE
CONSTITUTION IN AMERICAN CULTURE (1986). But see DAVID J. SIEMERS, RATIFYING
THE REPUBLIC: ANTIFEDERALISTS AND FEDERALISTS IN CONSTITUTIONAL TIME (2002).
21. See MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE WARREN COURT AND THE PURSUIT OF JUSTICE
(1998); Justice William J. Brennan, Assoc. Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, The Constitution
of
the
United
States:
Contemporary
Ratification
(Oct.
12,
1985),
staffweb.wilkes.edu/kyle.kreider/Brennan.doc (last accessed Apr. 18, 2016); see also
LUCAS A. POWE, JR.,THE WARREN COURT AND AMERICAN POLITICS (2000).
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uses of history)” (p. 20). Fleming appropriately analogizes this
constructivism to the turn taken by Rawls in Political Liberalism,
characterizing it as a quest for the best interpretation, with history
a part of the quest, while carefully noting that “[h]istory is, can
only be, and should only be a starting point in constitutional
interpretation” (p. 21).
ASPIRATIONALISM IN HISTORICISM
Following the scholarship in what I recently learned is a new
scholarly literature in “the history of originalism,” Fleming rightly
notes that originalism as an “ism”—as opposed to one
longstanding modality of constitutional interpretation—is
actually a relatively new phenomenon: it essentially begins with
Robert Bork, Edwin Meese, and Raoul Berger, forged in reaction
to the Warren Court. Part of my own contribution to that new
literature has been to underline the degree to which newish
originalism as an “ism” (what Whittington calls “old” originalism,
and I have called “reactive” originalism) is only contingently
linked to conservatism, theoretically and historically. This old,
reactive originalism by the Right represented, in many respects, a
revival of majoritarian, democratic, judicial-restraintist, “clearmistake” progressivism: the charge against Warren Court liberals
by the Old/Reactive originalists was hypocrisy (“you criticized
judicial activism and Lochner and judges reading their own
politics into law—and, look, you are doing the same thing!”).22 In
this majoritarian, democratic, anti- or minimally constitutionalist
guise, originalism as an “ism” was the antithesis of
aspirationalist/perfectionist moral readings of the Constitution.
In chapter one of Fidelity to Our Imperfect Constitution,
Fleming has his own charge of hypocrisy to lodge against
contemporary conservative originalists like Michael McConnell,
Steven Calabresi, and others, faint-hearted in the face of charges
that strict originalism would de-legitimize things like Brown v.
Board of Education (1954)’s reading of the Fourteenth
22. Ken I. Kersch, Constitutional Conservatives Remember the Progressive Era, in
THE PROGRESSIVES’ CENTURY: POLITICAL REFORM, CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT,
AND THE MAKING OF THE AMERICAN STATE, supra note 14 [hereinafter Kersch,
Constitutional Conservatives Remember the Progressive Era]; Ken I. Kersch,
Ecumenicalism Through Constitutionalism: The Discursive Development of Constitutional
Conservatism in National Review, 1955–1980, 25 STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 86 (2011)
[hereinafter, Kersch, Ecumenicalism Through Constitutionalism].
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Amendment’s equal protection clause to bar sex discrimination,
and/or (for some) due process liberty to protect against sexual
orientation discrimination. Fleming charges them with adopting
the view, virtually indistinguishable from Dworkin’s aspiration/
moral concept/conception approach, that purports to be grounded
in the authority of these relatively abstract textual constitutional
provisions, but recognizes, implicitly, that the provisions must be
read in light of updated understandings of the requirements of
justice, liberty, and equality.23 In doing so, these originalists have
forfeited the claim for originalism as a stay against (supposedly
unconstrained,
free-wheeling,
subjective/political)
living
constitutionalism in its moral reading guise. Fleming’s argument
here is dead-on—exactly right.
The problem, however, is that, as I have emphasized in recent
work, conservatives as a group, and conservative
constitutionalists, have never claimed to be opposed to moral
readings of the Constitution: this opposition is an artifact of
constitutional theory as practiced in the law schools by law
professors. While that might have seemed to be the world to legal
academics, it was never the world of either the wider conservative
movement, or even conservative constitutional theorists, many of
whom were not law professors, but political scientists and political
philosophers.
Of course, the early modern constitutional conservatives like
Justice Field were aspirationalist moralists about individual
liberty: it was Field, after all, who in his Slaughterhouse dissent
(1873) insisted on an expansive—indeed, revolutionary—reading
of the Fourteenth Amendment’s new rights provisions. To read it
otherwise, Field said, would render the Amendment’s adoption
“a vain and idle enactment.”24 This is the reason that Justice Hugo
Black, who knew whereof he spoke, insisted that any ruling that
smacked of Lochnerism amounted to a return to “natural law.”
But there is a much more proximate aspirationalist/moralist
conservative constitutionalism to be found in the postwar
constitutional theory of the Straussians—of men like Martin
Diamond, Harry V. Jaffa, and Walter Berns. These people
sometimes disagreed vehemently, at times viciously, about many
23. Baude, supra note 6; see Steven G. Calabresi & Julia T. Rickert, Originalism and
Sex Discrimination, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1, 101 (2011); Michael W. McConnell, Originalism
and the Desegregation Decisions, 81 VA. L. REV. 947, 1140 (1995).
24. Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 96 (1873) (Field, J., dissenting).
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things (the antagonism between the East Coasters (Allan Bloom
and Walter Berns, for example, and the West Coasters (Jaffa) was
especially pronounced). But Straussianism was defined by its
insistence on substantive moral ends in politics and
constitutionalism, the source of the foundational distinction
Straussians drew between ancient and modern political thinkers
(Plato and Aristotle, e.g., versus Machiavelli and Hobbes). These
mid-century constitutional theorists were quite explicit in
opposing the pure majoritarianism and legal positivism they
associated with Progressivism.25 Since Bork and Scalia’s
originalism is positivism, and genealogically Progressive, these
conservative constitutional theorists have always set themselves
in opposition to Bork and Scalia (on the current Court, Clarence
Thomas is their man). Let me emphasize that, while these people
may be largely unknown to constitutional theorists in the legal
academy, they are, and have long been, major thinkers on the
constitutional Right. As men trained in political philosophy
(mostly) at the University of Chicago, it is worth adding, they
brought an immense intellectual sophistication to their
constitutional theory: this is not fringe constitutional theory, or
lesser constitutional theory, but very serious stuff.
Fleming’s focus on the recent updating originalism of
McConnell, Calabresi, and others raises a different dimension of
all this, and one that sounds in legal theory, intellectual history,
and American constitutional development. As a matter of legal
theory, this development was inevitable. While it is true that an
intransigent fundamentalism that brooks no adjustment or
accommodation to change can be surprisingly durable—and, to
some fanatics, holds an enduring appeal26—this is less than likely
25. The same was true of the Roman Catholic constitutional theory of roughly the
same period. It is no coincidence that, these days, many Straussians are housed at Catholic
universities. See JOHN COURTNEY MURRAY, SJ, WE HOLD THESE TRUTHS: CATHOLIC
REFLECTIONS ON THE AMERICAN PROPOSITION (1960); Kersch, Constitutional
Conservatives Remember the Progressive Era, supra note 22; Ken I. Kersch, Beyond
Originalism: Conservative Declarationism and Constitutional Redemption, 71 MD. L. REV.
229, 249 (2011); see also EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR. THE CRISIS OF DEMOCRATIC
THEORY: SCIENTIFIC NATURALISM AND THE PROBLEM OF VALUE (1973).
26. Consider, for example, the problem of Islamic fundamentalism—one of the chief
scourges of our time, or the Roman Catholic extreme Right (though even they,
conveniently, don’t argue today, as Catholic theology once did, that any artificial form of
pain relief or sedations, for a headache, surgery, or an excruciating disease, contravened
natural law, and the naturalness of human suffering, as lived and exemplified by Christ on
the Cross). See JOANNA BOURKE, THE STORY OF PAIN: FROM PRAYER TO PAINKILLERS
(2014).
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to appeal to the mass in a modern liberal democracy (or perhaps
even a religion) over the long term. Change will be
accommodated: what will be debated is the pace of that change.
Any institution or institutional actor charged with interpreting the
law, cleric or jurist, who refuses on principle (in a liberal,
democratic state) to accommodate significant social change, to an
extent that they arrive at a position wholly divorced from the
ambient social order will see his or her authority undermined—
just as it would be undermined by the assertion of their authority
in a progressive way that takes flight from the law they are
charged with interpreting in a way so far in the vanguard as to be
divorced from the prevailing social order in precisely the opposite
direction.27 There have always been conservatives who have
recognized this: this, after all, is Burkeanism, the philosophy of
prudent, incremental adjustment and reform, such as, for
example, in the constitutional theory of, earlier, Philip Kurland,
and, today, James R. Stoner, Jr. Stoner is a political scientist and,
once again, if one looks at conservative constitutional theory
outside of the law schools—where, until very recently, most
conservative constitutional theory was written and practiced in
modern, postwar United States—the opposition between the
conservatives and the liberals (for example, David Strauss) is not
all that stark.28
But there’s more to it than (conservative) Burkeanism. The
most prominent postwar non-legal academy constitutional
theorists—theorists as visible and influential as Martin Diamond,
Walter Berns, and Brent Bozell—were consistent and express in
holding that the Constitution would have to be interpreted to take
into account social change. As philosophers rather than lawyers
(Bozell being the exception), these conservatives preferred
subtlety to throwing down the gauntlet on behalf of an extreme
and intransigent position and then daring their opponents (as
lawyers tend to do) to take a diametrically opposite point of view
27. See MARTIN SHAPIRO, COURTS: A COMPARATIVE AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS
(1981).
28. For examples of conservative constitutional theory, see generally PHILIP B.
KURLAND, POLITICS, THE CONSTITUTION, AND THE WARREN COURT (1970); JAMES R.
STONER, JR., COMMON LAW AND LIBERAL THEORY: COKE, HOBBES, AND THE ORIGINS
OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM (1992); JAMES R. STONER, JR., COMMON-LAW
LIBERTY: RETHINKING AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM (2003); Philip B. Kurland,
American Systems of Laws and Constitutions, in AMERICAN CIVILIZATION 141 (Daniel J.
Boorstin ed., 1972).
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(e.g. fidelity v. morality). Long before Dorf, Balkin, and Fleming,
Martin Diamond argued that we owed the Founders immense
respect both because they illuminated the principles upon which
our political order rests and because they were learned and wise,
but that we are not in any strict way bound by a duty of blind
obeisance to follow their dictates.29 Viewed in this context, the
charge lodged against conservatives that they too are
aspirationalists and moral readers, and take into account social
change over time, is both right and beside the point. It is a very
useful point to make as law professors are poised to write the next,
and perhaps the final, chapter in the “ism” v. “ism” debates that
have driven constitutional theory in the law schools for more than
a generation. But in the broader ongoing debates between
conservative and liberal constitutionalists in politics—in a context
in which conservative aspirationalism is ascendant and the
concern for “judicial restraint” is waning—the gotcha charge is
likely to be greeted by little more than a shrug. As Reva Siegel
and Robert Post have rightly emphasized, the battle now is over
the substantive liberal and conservative visions.30
CONCLUSION
Fleming’s Fidelity to Our Imperfect Constitution is both
highly significant and a sign of the times. Starting from the
Dworkinian/aspirationalist/moral perfectionist premises where
he has situated his normative constitutional theory across his
distinguished career, Jim Fleming has now moved to consider in a
sustained way the appropriate place of history in constitutional
interpretation. While it may be true that, in some sense, the school
to which Fleming has long belonged acknowledged history (in its
proper place), denied judicial supremacy, accepted the premises
of departmentalism, popular constitutionalism, and “protestant”
constitutional pluralism—as Fleming staunchly insists here—
against longstanding, widespread (and, he insists, mistaken)
scholarly perception, moral aspirationalists can certainly not be
taken to have been preoccupied or identified with these positions
29. See Kersch, Constitutional Conservatives Remember the Progressive Era, supra
note 22; Kersch, Ecumenicalism Through Constitutionalism, supra note 22, at 99.
30. See Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Democratic Constitutionalism, in THE
CONSTITUTION IN 2020, at 25, 26 (Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel eds., 2009); see also
Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Roe Rage: Democratic Constitutionalism and Backlash, 42
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 373, 373 (2007).
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over the years. But in a conservative era these preoccupations and
premises have now set the agenda for the field for more than a
generation. It is at this point that Fleming, in this book, steps in
to, at length, fashion his reckoning with this reality.
In a sense, Fleming here holds the line: aspiration, he argues,
is, and must be, primary. Historicism is “subsidiary,” and
instrumental, playing a supporting role in the quest for moral
perfectionism. My comments here looked at this the other way
round, emphasizing, in an empirical and positivist spirit, that
aspirationalism and moral perfectionism are history. And they are
a particularly prominent part of American history. In interesting
ways, they are baked into the core of the American national and
constitutional experiment, which is both liberal and
providentialist. Moral aspirationalism took center stage with the
waxing of disputes over chattel slavery, the Civil War, and the
addition of the Constitution’s Civil War Amendments. It was the
Union victory in the Civil War that launched aspirationalism,
constitutional perfectionism, and living constitutionalism as
“isms.” But it wasn’t until much later—with the political theory of
John Rawls (Theory of Justice (1971)), the legal theory of Ronald
Dworkin (Taking Rights Seriously (1977)), and their progeny—
which prominently includes Fleming himself—that a more rooted,
nationalist, patriotic, historically-minded, story-telling and
narrating aspirationalism/perfectionism/living constitutionalism
insisted in a sustained way that, in the realm of constitutional
theory and politics, philosophy was higher and better, and history
was lesser and lower. This, of course, was a recipe to both
mandarin academic detachment and public irrelevance.
Conservative originalists seized upon this presumptuous, selfsatisfied detachment, riding the vulnerabilities of Fleming’s
school all the way to the top—to the point where, as Fleming
himself acknowledges, the best new work on constitutional theory
(that reaches, by his lights, the right results) starts from
historicist—and, purportedly, originalist—premises. What
Fleming does in Fidelity to Our Imperfect Constitution is make the
case that work by Balkin, Amar, Ackerman, and other “liberal
originalists” is actually suffused with—he insists, more formally,
starts from—moral or philosophical premises. At the same time,
Fleming recognizes the value of liberal originalists attending to
history in selling those premises, particularly in American
political/constitutional culture. And he emphasizes the degree to
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which even the best new conservative originalism has also adopted
moral, philosophical aspirationalism in taking right results
positions on core issues like racial segregation and women’s
equality, the rejection of which would be politically fraught, if not
ultimately de-legitimating and discrediting. Fleming reads these
developments as demonstrating that we must now all
acknowledge the primacy of moral readings of the Constitution.
My conclusion, however, is different. I have noted that the
binary between living constitutionalism and historicism that
Fleming seeks to transcend here by calling the fight for moral
readings, while acknowledging the (instrumental/subsidiary/
provisional) significance of historicism, is and has always been
false when viewed from the broader perspective of the history and
trajectory of U.S. constitutional thought and development and of
the
contention
between
progressivism/liberalism
and
conservatism in the United States. This binary is an artifact of the
hermetic theoretical debates of the mid-to-late twentieth century
legal academy, which, in a classically legalist battle, pitted a
morally aspirationalist (or majoritarian positivist) living
constitutionalism as an “ism” against a historicist originalism as
an “ism.” Long before this in theory and politics, progressives
(especially) and liberals, and even radicals (see the speeches of
the anarchist Emma Goldman and the Socialist Eugene V.
Debs!), were also robustly historicist, and conservatives—very
prominent and influential conservatives, and particularly the
leading conservative constitutional theorists (who, in lots of cases,
of necessity, given the hegemony of liberalism in mid-to-late
twentieth century U.S. law schools, plied their trade outside the
law schools) were also aspirationalists and moral perfectionists.
The two points of view are, as a matter of fact—and theory—
interpenetrating and interpenetrated. They always have been and
always will be, at least over the long term, in our actual
constitutional life and practice. As such, Fleming’s important
book breaks new ground in its prominent attempt at synthesis.
But it cannot resist pulling back before a full—and accurate—
synthesis to call the fight for the philosophical, moral readings
camp. This is an unfortunate conclusion to what is ultimately a
thoughtful, timely, and engaging contribution to understanding
the way we live now in the United States, and in U.S.
constitutional theory.

